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5Executive Summary
Three policy changes could make rice prices more affordable for the poor. First, the government 
should remove Minister of Trade (MOT) regulation 27/2017 on price ceiling. This policy has 
not lowered rice prices, which rose to IDR 10,646.56 per kilogram on average or 12.07% 
above the price ceiling between September 2016 and May 2017. Rice prices in Indonesia was 
approximately twice as high compared to the international reference prices in May 2017. The 
price ceiling unfairly puts the responsibility of lowering domestic rice prices on retailers while 
the benefits accrue to middlemen, rice millers, and wholesalers.
Secondly, MOT regulation 103/2015 article 9 (1.b), which grants the National Logistics Agency 
(Badan Urusan Logistik/Bulog) a monopoly on rice imports, should be removed and the government 
should focus on its role as regulator to ensure fairness and transparency in the import process. 
Since Bulog must consider the government’s political and bureaucratic processes, it cannot time 
its imports based on market needs and conditions. Consequently, it spends more than it should 
on rice import, unnecessarily wasting up to IDR 303 billion (USD 22.78 million) between 2010 and 
2017. Rice importation and distribution should be opened as business opportunities for qualified 
private companies, especially as the distribution chains of imported rice are shorter than those 
for domestic rice, so imports can quickly meet the needs of the market.
Thirdly, Bulog should be fully focused on its duty in disaster relief, preparing, managing, and 
distributing rice to affected areas during emergencies. National Disasters and Management Agency 
(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/BPNB) recorded 1,234 emergency situations during the 
first half of 2017, including floods, landslides, tornadoes, and earthquakes. Disasters are expected 
to continue to hit the country frequently, making humanitarian relief an important priority.
6Current Situation
Rice is the staple food for most Indonesian people. National annual rice consumption 
is estimated to be around 45.7 million tons (OECD & FAO, 2015). According to a 2015 
joint report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), Indonesia’s 
annual per capita rice consumption is 163 kilograms, higher than in Thailand (142.5 
kilograms), China (76.4 kilograms), and India (73.4 kilograms). This high consumption 
means that rice prices have significant impact on the livelihood of Indonesian people, 
especially those with low income. 
There are approximately 28 million poor people in Indonesia with an average monthly 
income of IDR 300,000 (USD 22.64) (The World Bank, 2015), and the average rice price in 
early May 2017 reached IDR 10,600 (USD 0.80) per kilogram (Ministry of Trade, 2017). This 
price is nearly twice the World Bank reference price during the same period (The World 
Bank, 2017).1 This suggests that a poor person consuming the national average and paying 
the average price would spend approximately 47.9% of their monthly income on rice.2 
The Indonesian government argues that the high price of rice is the result of the long distribution 
chain for domestic rice (Ariyanti, 2016; Jefriando, 2016). As illustrated in Figure 1, rice from 
farmers passes through five different actors before it reaches consumers. 
Figure 1
Levels of Domestic Rice Distribution in Indonesia
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Source: KPPU (2016)
The Indonesian Competition Commission (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha/KPPU) (2016) 
reports that the domestic rice distribution system in Indonesia is subject to imperfect and 
monopolistic competition where indicated in Figure 1. 
1 The World Bank reference price in May 2017 was IDR 5,609.28 (USD 0.42) per kg (The World Bank, 2017), and is based on the 
price of rice in Thailand.
2 This estimate does not fully apply to poor people who receive subsidized rice through the Raskin/Rastra program or food 
vouchers from the government, nor to poor people who work as rice farmers, since they could at least partially fulfil their need 
for rice from their rice fields. 
Rice price in 
Indonesia is nearly 
twice The World 
Bank reference 
price during the 
same period.
7At the level of farmers, middlemen, and rice millers, imperfect competition refers to the situation 
in which the purchasing actors (e.g. the middlemen) collude and agree among themselves to buy 
the rice from the selling actors (e.g. the farmers) at a predetermined price rather than the market 
price. At the level of wholesalers, imperfect competition refers to oligopolistic competition, 
where only a handful of large corporations control the distribution process (Bhinadi, 2012) and 
therefore control the prices as well (Pradana, 2015). 
KPPU states that there is monopolistic competition at the retailers-consumers level even though 
there are a number of retailers in the market because there is little to no difference in the price 
charged by different retailers in the same area, mostly due, they claim, to the oligopolistic 
competition between the wholesalers mentioned above (KPPU, 2016).
Existing Policies
A. Domestic policies
The government imposed a nationwide price floor for rice in 2002 as part of their procurement 
price policy (Harga Pembelian Pemerintah/HPP) (Food Security Agency, 2013), and a price ceiling 
since 2016, imposed through their maximum retail price policy for the consumers (Harga Eceran 
Tertinggi/HET) as stipulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Trade (MOT) 27/2017. 
The government tasks the National Logistics Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik/Bulog) with 
maintaining the price floor by purchasing rice from farmers at a pre-determined price, in 
accordance with the existing regulation. Bulog may keep rice in reserve,3 and distribute this 
reserve as part of their subsidized rice program (Raskin) for registered low-income households, 
or as part of relief efforts to regions affected by natural disasters.
To implement the government’s price ceiling, Bulog conducts market monitoring activity called 
Market Operations (Operasi Pasar) (Ministry of Trade, 2016). This activity aims to ensure that all 
retailers sell their rice at or below the price ceiling, and failure to comply would result in their 
licenses being revoked (Masa, 2017). According to officials from the Ministry of Trade, this policy 
serves as an indicator for when the government needs to intervene in the market (Sagala & Adri, 
Personal Interview, 21 March 2017).
The government aims to control rice prices at both the farmer and consumer levels using these 
fixed floor and ceiling prices. Past and present regulations regarding the floor and price ceilings 
are shown in Table 1.
3 A rice reserve keeps the rice stock at a “safe” level, to be used as a buffer when there is a rice shortage from market failures or 
natural disasters. The exact amount varies and depends on the rice market situation. This is also referred to as the “iron stock”. 
8Table 1
Government Price Floor and Ceilings Policies on Rice, 2002 – 2015 
No. Regulation
Floor Price (IDR per kg)
Price Ceiling – Rice 
(IDR per kg)Harvested Rice 
Paddy*
Ready-to-Mill 
Rice Paddy** Rice
1. Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 09/2002 1,230 1,725 2,790 -
2. Inpres 02/2005 1,330 1,765 2,790 -
3. Inpres 13/2005 1,730 2,250 3,550 -
4. Inpres 03/2007 2,000 2,575 4,000 -
5. Inpres 01/2008 2,240 2,800 4,300 -
6. Inpres 08/2008 2,400 2,440 4,600 -
7. Inpres 07/2009 2,640 3,300 5,060 -
8. Inpres 03/2012 3,300 4,150 6,600 -
9. Inpres 05/2015 3,700 4,600 7,300 -
10.
Regulation of the 
Minister of Trade (MOT) 
63/2016
3,700 4,600 7,300 9,500
11. MOT 27/2017 3,700 4,600 7,300 9,500
‘* = Also known as Gabah Kering Panen (GKP), husked rice grains with maximum water level of 25% and foreign materials 
maximum 10%
** = Also known as Gabah Kering Giling (GKG), husked rice grains with maximum water level of 14% and foreign materials 
maximum 3%
Sources:
1. Food Security Agency (2012)
2. MOT 63/2016 on Reference for Government Procurement and Maximum Retail Prices 
3. MOT 27/2017 on Reference for Government Procurement and Maximum Retail Prices
B. International policies
The government restricts rice imports both to support farmers’ income and to push down prices 
to keep rice affordable for consumers (Presidential Office, 2017). The government expects the 
price ceiling to keep rice prices sufficiently low (Budiyanti, 2017), while it expects restricted 
rice imports to ensure that domestic rice dominates the market, eventually benefitting farmers 
(Bulog, 2012; Hakim, 2016; The Jakarta Post, 2017). 
The government allows only Bulog to import rice in order to fulfill its duties to stabilize rice 
prices, provide disaster relief, and alleviate poverty, as stipulated in MOT 103/2015 article 9 
(1.b.). Bulog must receive formal authorization from the Ministry of Trade before importing any 
rice, and this authorization requires a ministerial coordination meeting on economic affairs 
(MOT 103/2015 article 9 (2) and article 10 (3)), and may even depend on a direct order from 
9the President (Faqih, 2015; Melani, 2015). MOT 103/2015 allows private companies to import 
specific types of rice for industrial purposes (article 12)4 and special dietary needs (article 18)5 
only. As a result, from the consumer’s perspective, there is a government-sanctioned monopoly 
for rice imports that must also be timed by the government.
There is a government-sanctioned 
monopoly for rice imports that must 
also be timed by the government.
This policy can be traced back to the late 1960s when Bulog was tasked with food stock procurement 
and rice price stabilization by the newly established New Order (Orde Baru) under former President 
Soeharto. In 1995, the Indonesian government extended Bulog’s authority beyond rice to sugar, 
wheat, wheat flour, soy beans, and livestock feed distribution, but after the Asian financial crisis 
in 1998, it reverted to rice distribution only (Bulog, 2012b). In this period, Bulog’s monopoly right 
to rice imports was abolished as a part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural reform 
package (Patunru & Basri, 2012), but in 2002, it was restored by the government. 
In 2015, the government, via the Ministry of Trade, gave authorization to Bulog to stabilize the 
price and supply of not only rice, but also several strategic food items: beef, soy beans, corn, 
cooking oil, flour, chicken meat, shallots, and peppers (Bulog, 2015; Ministry of Trade, 2015). 
In 2016, via Presidential Regulation 48/2016, the President strengthened this authorization by 
appointing Bulog to stabilize the supply and prices of rice, corn, and soy beans. Furthermore, 
with the additional mandate from the ministerial coordination meeting on economic affairs, this 
regulation also enables Bulog to obtain the rights to stabilize the supply and prices of other food 
items, namely sugar, cooking oil, flour, shallots, chili, beef, chicken meat, and chicken eggs.
4 Including broken rice and broken sticky rice. These rice types are typically used in the rice flour industry.
5 Including whole sticky rice, and several rice types such as Japonica, Basmati, and Thai Hom Mali. Each of these varieties can 
only contain broken grain of maximum 5%, which is considered as first-class quality according to the Indonesian National 
Standard (SNI 6128-2008).
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Analysis
Considering the high consumption of rice in Indonesia and the toll taken by high prices on the 
living standards of 28 million poor Indonesians, it is worth analyzing whether the government’s 
attempts to control rice prices by imposing restrictive trade policies are effective. 
A. Price floor and price ceiling policies
Price floor and ceiling policies have had mixed results. From 2007 to 2015, the yearly 
average prices at the farmer’s level was above the floor prices by 20.89% (Figure 2), 
but the monthly average price at the consumer market from September 2016 (when 
the price ceiling was introduced) to May 2017 were 12.07% above than the price 
ceiling (Figure 3).
Figure 2
Yearly Average Prices of Harvested Rice Paddy (GKP) at
the Farmers Level and Government Price Floor, 2007 – 2015
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Sources are collated from Statistics Indonesia (2016) and Food Security Agency (2013)
Figure 3
Monthly Average Rice Prices in the Consumers Market and Government Price Ceiling
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If retailers are forced to sell at the price ceiling, there is a 
risk that retailers will blend high quality rice with low quality 
rice (such as Bulog’s subsidized rice) to avoid losses.
Rice retailers in several traditional markets in Jakarta were concerned that they would not 
be able to turn a profit if they sold their products at the price ceiling because the wholesaler 
prices were already higher than the price ceiling (Interviews, June 15-16, 2017). If retailers are 
forced to sell at the price ceiling, there is a risk that retailers will blend high quality rice with 
low quality rice (such as Bulog’s subsidized rice) to avoid losses.
The Indonesian Traditional Market Retailers Association (Asosiasi Pedagang Pasar Seluruh 
Indonesia/APPSI) reports that its members cannot comply with price ceiling policy because they 
must deal with various surcharges, such as transportation and labor costs, in their transactions 
with the wholesalers (Medianti, 2017) that are not accounted for when setting the price ceiling. 
In addition, traditional market retailers must pay wholesalers up front, and wholesalers may sell 
their products to the retailers above the price ceiling. Under these conditions, traditional market 
retailers must sell above the price ceiling or go out of business. In contrast, modern retailers 
are able to pay wholesalers at a later date, improving their position when negotiating selling 
prices and enabling them to comply with the price ceiling (M. Maulana, Personal Interview, May 
25, 2017). 
The problem faced by traditional market retailers illustrates how price ceilings can interfere with 
the ability of retailers to find a market-clearing price, at which the quantity demanded by the 
consumers is in balance with the quantity supplied by the producers (Morton, 2001). This market 
intervention by the government has distorted supply and demand in the market, increasing the 
chance of rice shortages. This is what economic theory predicts will follow from such policies 
(Investopedia, 2003; Vogel, 2004).
The recent experience of Venezuela (Gupta, 2015; Wilson, 2016; Wu, 2016) illustrates how 
serious the potential risk of forcing small grocery stores to sell their products at government-
mandated prices can be. Since 2003, the Venezuelan government has imposed price controls 
on essential consumer products, including food, household appliances, and hygiene products. 
Instead of lowering prices, this policy triggered black market activity and increased shortages 
from an average of 5% in 2003 to 22.2% in 2013, and in 2016 it even reached 41.3% (Wu, 2016). 
These shortages have contributed to the sharp increase in the prices of maize flour, a staple 
food in Venezuela. Its prices have risen tenfold from VEF 19 (USD 1.9) per kilogram in February 
2015 to VEF 190 (USD 19) in May 2016 as stated by Venezuelan National Superintendency of 
Fair Costs and Prices (SUNDECOP) and as reported by various media (Charner & Clarke, 2016; 
DataMark Brazil, 2016; The Straits Times, 2016). The price of of maize in the black market was 
even higher, reaching up to VEF 1,500 (USD 150) per kilogram (Wilson, 2016).
This market intervention by the government has distorted supply 
and demand in the market, increasing the chance of rice shortages. 
12
B. Rice distribution system in Indonesia
Retailers report that they cannot comply with HET because prices are already high when they 
buy the rice from wholesalers, and the government claims that the long distribution chain is 
problematic and even the major factor increasing rice prices in Indonesia. To address these 
arguments, it is important to determine who gains the most from the current system.  
Domestic rice
“Due to the inefficiency of rice distribution system, it is common to find huge price disparity 
between the producers and the consumers level”
– Mahardika (2013) –6 
Domestic rice from the farmers goes through four to six distribution actors before it reaches the 
consumers. First, farmers sell their harvested rice paddy to the middlemen or to the paddy cutters, 
who dry the rice and sell it to the rice millers. After the rice is milled, the millers sell to the major 
wholesalers who own storage warehouses. Major wholesalers then sell the rice to the smaller 
scale wholesalers in the provincial-level markets (such as Central Rice Market of Cipinang in DKI 
Jakarta Province), or to those who sell the rice to the different islands in Indonesia. These smaller 
wholesalers bring the rice to the retailers, or, in the case of Central Rice Market of Cipinang, the rice 
must go through the selling agents before they could reach the retailers. Only then, the consumers 
can purchase the rice in the market. The distribution process is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4
Distribution Supply Chain of Domestic Rice in Indonesia
Farmers
Middlemen
Rice millers / large-scale
middlemen
Major wholesalers (with warehouses) 
/ large-scale rice millers
Paddy cutters
Bulog
Inter-island wholesalers Wholesalers at other
provincial-level markets
(e.g. in North Sulawesi)
Wholesalers at Central 
Rice Market of Cipinang
Agents
Retailers
Consumers
 
Sources are collated from:
1. Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, as cited in Tambunan (2008)
2. Mardianto, Supriatna, and Agustin (2005), as cited in Ariwibowo (2013)
3. Mahardika (2013)
6 Mahardika, T.K.S. (2013). Kajian Distribusi Beras di Wilayah DKI Jakarta Melalui Pasar Induk Beras Cipinang [A Study on Rice 
Distribution in DKI Jakarta Through Central Rice Market of Cipinang]. Bogor: Institut Pertanian Bogor [Bogor Agricultural Institute], p.4
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In each distribution chain, either the middlemen, the rice millers, or the wholesalers have the 
largest profit margin (Table 2). On the island of Java, these profit margins ranged around 60% to 
80% per kilogram. In contrast, retailers gained a profit margin of only 1.8% to 9.1% per kilogram. 
This situation shows that those who gain the largest benefit are involved in the distribution 
system before the rice gets into the retail market. In these circumstances, price ceiling would be 
ineffective since it only pushes the retailers to lower their rice prices while they are not the ones 
setting the price high.
Both the high prices charged along the supply chain and the length of the supply chain reduce 
the rice farmers’ share7 (Azzaino 1981, as cited in Mahardika, 2013). There are four distribution 
actors in East Java, and five actors in West Java. DKI Jakarta also has five distribution actors, to 
which around 71% of the rice supply comes from the farmers in West Java, and the rest are from 
Banten, Central Java, East Java, Lampung, South Sumatera, and South Sulawesi. The farmers’ 
share in East Java, West Java, and the rice-supplying regions for DKI Jakarta only reached 
between 38% and 45%. 
In North Sulawesi, where there are only three rice distribution actors, the farmers’ share reached 
73.68%. This might be due to the scale of landowners in this province, in which 120,899 or 47.7% 
of its landholding agricultural households are medium and large-scale farmers8 (Statistics 
Indonesia, 2013b). Compared to the small-scale farmers, medium and large-scale farmers have 
better position when negotiating their selling prices to the rice millers as they may not have to 
rely on the middlemen to do so. Unfortunately, since nearly 56% of agricultural households in 
the country are small-scale farmers, the rice distribution system harms most of the farmers 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2013a).9
Table 2 illustrates the margin of rice distribution and the farmers’ share in the provinces 
mentioned above in more detail.
7 Farmers’ share is calculated by dividing farmers’ selling prices with the retailers’ selling prices. The longer the distribution 
process, the smaller their share would be.
8 Each medium-scale farmer controls between 1.0 and 1.99 hectares of land, and each large-scale farmer controls more than 2 
hectares (Ambarwati, Harahap, Sadoko, & White, 2016).
9 Of 26,135,469 agricultural households in Indonesia, 14,622,396 (55.94%) of them control only a small plot of land, under 0.5 ha.
In each distribution chain, either 
the middlemen, the rice millers, 
or the wholesalers have the 
largest profit margin 
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Table 2
Profit Margin of Rice Distribution in the Provinces of West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, and DKI Jakarta
Level of 
Distribution
West Java* East Java** North Sulawesi*** DKI Jakarta****
Selling 
Prices 
(IDR/
kg)
Cost 
(IDR/
kg)
Profit 
Margin+
Selling 
Prices 
(IDR/
kg)
Cost 
(IDR/
kg)
Profit 
Margin
Selling 
Prices 
(IDR/
kg)
Cost 
(IDR/
kg)
Profit 
Margin
Selling 
Prices 
(IDR/
kg)
Cost 
(IDR/
kg)
Profit 
Margin
(IDR/
kg) (%)
(IDR/
kg) (%)
(IDR/
kg) (%)
(IDR/
kg) (%)
Farmers 3,700 3,147 7,000 4,110
Middlemen 3,800 63.5 36.5 0.9% 3,720 380 193 6.13%
8,167 67 1,100 15.7% 7,318 260 2,948 78%Rice millers 
/ large-scale 
middlemen 
4,000 67.5 132.5 3.5% 7,115 405 2,290 80.4%
Wholesalers 
(with 
warehouses) 
/ large 
-scale rice 
millers
8,700 2,255 2,445 61.1%
7,393 150 128 1.7% 8,500 117 217 2.6%
7,681 125 238 3.2%
Wholesalers 9,400 82.5 617.5 7.1% 7,985 125 179 2.3%
Agents
9,700 100 200 2.1% 7,650 120 137 1.8% 9,500 229 771 9.1%
8,546 385 176 2.2%
Retailers 8,950 55 349 4.1%
Farmers’ 
share 38.14% 41.14% 73.68% 45.92%
Notes:
•	 This table focuses on the rice distribution actors, and does not show the cost and profit margins of farmers (producers).
•	 Rice in DKI Jakarta mostly come from the Central Rice Market in Cipinang. Around 71% of their supply comes from the 
farmers in West Java, and the rest are from Banten, Central Java, East Java, Lampung, South Sumatera, and South Sulawesi.
•	 Rice at the farmers’ level are husked rice grains (GKP).
•	 Rice at the retailers’ level are non-packaging rice sold in traditional markets.
•	 Costs are including the expenses for drying, milling, transporting, and delivery.
+ = Profit margin is what proportion of the selling price, for each distribution actor, is profit. The profit is calculated by deducting 
purchasing prices and costs from selling prices, while profit margin is calculated by dividing their selling prices by their profit.
Sources:
* = Saragih (2014)
** = Ariwibowo (2013)
*** =  Ruauw (2015)
**** = Mahardika (2013)
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Imported Rice
Compared to domestic rice, imported rice has a shorter distribution 
system. While domestic rice goes through between four to six 
distribution actors (Figure 4), imported rice goes through at most three 
to reach the consumers (Figure 5). From importers, rice goes to either 
the wholesalers/agents or the supermarkets. From wholesalers, rice is 
sold to the sub agents and then retailers, or it may pass straight from the 
wholesalers to the retailers. Afterwards, consumers purchase rice from 
retailers or supermarkets. This short distribution system is possible 
because the imported rice is a processed, ready-to-cook product that 
does not require paddy cutters, middlemen, or rice millers. 
While reliable data for analyzing the profit margins of distribution actors for imported rice are not 
available yet, the short length of imported rice distribution system provides fewer opportunities 
for distribution actors to take advantage of the system. Therefore, providing better access to 
imported rice may allow the consumers to purchase at more affordable prices. 
Figure 5
Distribution Supply Chain of Imported Rice in Indonesia
BULOG / Importers
Wholesalers / Agents Supermarket
Consumers
Sub Agents Retailers
Sources are collated from:
1. Statistics Indonesia (2009), as cited in Surjasa, Gumbira-Sa’id, Arifin, Sukardi, & Jie (2013)
2. Kitano, Ariga, & Shimato (1999) 
C. Rice prices in Indonesia and the international market
From May 2009 to May 2017, rice prices in Indonesia had a different trajectory from international 
rice prices even though in May 2009 they were comparable at IDR 6,641 and IDR 5,546.77 
respectively (Figure 6). By May 2013, Indonesian rice prices increased by around 60.3% to IDR 
10,646 per kilogram, while the international market decreased by 4.4% to IDR 5,300.37 per 
kilogram. By May 2017, rice prices in Indonesia had risen even further, to IDR 13,125 per kilogram, 
or nearly twice its price in May 2009. In contrast, the international market price increased by just 
1.12% to IDR 5,609.28 per kilogram, less than half the rice prices in Indonesia.
This short distribution 
system is possible 
because the imported rice 
is a processed, ready-to-
cook product that does 
not require paddy cutters, 
middlemen, or rice millers. 
16
Figure 6
The Trend of Rice Prices in Indonesia and in International Market
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The relationship between rice prices in Indonesia and in the international market in the short 
term is different than in the long term. In the short term, a 10% price change in the international 
market corresponds with a 1.09% price change in the same direction in Indonesia. In the long 
term, changes in the international market do not have a significant impact on rice prices in 
Indonesia, allowing prices in Indonesia continuously deviate from the international trend and 
causing disconnection between them.10
Rice prices in Indonesia continuously deviate away from the 
international trend and causing disconnection between them
D. Bulog in a disadvantaged position
Even though imported rice offers an alternative to provide more affordable rice for the consumers, 
Bulog, the sole rice importer, is unable to seize this opportunity. The best time to import a product 
is when its international prices are low, but Bulog must wait for the instruction of the President or 
of the ministerial coordination meeting in accordance with MOT 103/2015 article 9 (2) and article 
10 (3) before it can import the rice. Bulog cannot import solely based on market conditions, but 
must follow the political consideration and bureaucratic procedures of the government. 
Rice importation by Bulog therefore becomes a high-cost operation. From January 2010 to March 
2017, Bulog frequently imported rice in large quantities when the international rice prices were higher 
than the previous months. This happened in 2010 (November and December), 2011 (September), 
2012 (December), 2013 (January), 2014 (October and December), 2015 (June), 2016 (January and 
February), and 2017 (March), as shown in Figure 7. Bulog could have saved more than IDR 303 billion 
(Table 3) or around USD 22.78 million had they purchased rice at least a month in advance.
10 These calculations are explained in more detail in the Annex. 
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Bulog cannot import solely based on market conditions, but must follow 
the political consideration and bureaucratic procedures of the government. 
Figure 7
The Trend of Rice Import by Bulog and the International Rice Prices, 
Jan 2010 to Mar 2017
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2010M11, 193,621.50
2013M01, 46,378.29
2012M12, 483,669.93
2014M10, 93,028.61
2015M06, 68,175.182014M12, 232,421.38
2016M01, 382,546.18
2016M02, 296,371.00
2017M03, 31,424.85
2011M09, 248,061.94
2010M12, 291,540.48
2010M11, 4,601.15
2011M09, 5,227.80 2013M01, 5,448.36 2014M10, 5,185.21
2014M12, 5,208.80
2016M01, 5,115.83
2016M02, 5,189.82
2012M12, 5,378.52
2010M12, 4,798.38
2017  M03, 4,934.73
2015M06, 5,007.78
Sources are collated from:
1. Statistics Indonesia (2010 - 2017)
2. The World Bank (2010 - 2017)
3. x-rates.com (2017) 
Table 3
Estimated Cost and Savings from Bulog’s Rice Import, Nov 2010 - Mar 2017
Actual Purchase by Bulog International 
Prices in the 
Previous Month 
(IDR/kg)
Estimated 
Cost 
(Million 
IDR)
Estimated 
Savings 
(Million 
IDR)
Year Month
Quantity 
(tons)
International 
Prices (IDR/kg)
Estimated Cost 
(Million IDR)*
2010
November 193,621.50 4,601.15 890,882 4,338.44 840,015 50,866
December 291,540.48 4,798.38 1,398,922 4,601.15 1,341,421 57,501
2011 September 248,061.94 5,227.80 1,296,818 4,825.92 1,197,127 99,691
2012 December 483,669.93 5,378.52 2,601,428 5,378.40 2,601,370 58
2013 January 46,378.29 5,448.36 252,686 5,378.52 249,447 3,239
2014
October 93,028.61 5,185.21 482,373 5,148.75 478,981 3,392
December 232,421.38 5,208.80 1,210,636 5,081.26 1,180,993 29,643
2015 June 68,175.17 5,007.78 341,406 4,998.25 340,757 650
2016
January 382,546.18 5,115.83 1,957,041 5,023.94 1,921,889 35,152
February 296,371.00 5,189.82 1,538,112 5,115.83 1,516,184 21,928
2017 March 31,424.85 4,934.73 155,073 4,893.76 153,786 1,287
TOTAL 12,125,378 TOTAL 11,821,970 303,408
Notes:
* = We did not to use Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF) calculation by Statistics Indonesia because the fluctuations between one 
period and the others are too high, which made the calculation questionable. Instead, we estimated import costs using the quantity 
imported and the international rice prices reported by The World Bank
Sources are collated from:
1. Statistics Indonesia (2010 - 2017)
2. The World Bank (2010 - 2017)
3. x-rates.com (2017) 
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The high prices Bulog pays for imported rice endanger its financial health.11 From the beginning 
of January 2010 to the end of December 2015, Bulog’s debt grew by 74%, from IDR 12.7 million 
to more than 22.1 million (Table 4), forming more than three quarters of its overall assets as 
the debts are nearly four times higher than its equity. Bulog’s financial situation is at high 
risk,12 signifying its inability to generate sufficient business revenues to sustain itself without 
relying on the government budget.
Bulog’s financial situation is at high risk,  signifying its inability 
to generate sufficient business revenues to sustain itself 
without relying on the government budget.
  Table 4
Bulog’s Financial Statement, January 2010 – December 2015
Date Assets (IDR) Liabilities/Debts (IDR) Equity (IDR)
Debt-to-
Asset Ratio
Debt-to-
Equity Ratio
1 Jan 2010 15,339,520,170,928 12,728,776,536,863 2,610,743,634,065 82.98% 487.55%
31 Dec 2010 14,981,238,491,019 10,991,177,954,333 3,990,060,536,686 73.37% 275.46%
31 Dec 2011 18,672,029,209,476 13,745,427,793,835 4,926,601,415,641 73.62% 279.00%
31 Dec 2012 26,839,682,400,613 22,286,427,567,471 4,553,254,833,142 83.04% 489.46%
31 Dec 2013 25,891,624,271,796 21,675,128,996,912 4,216,495,274,884 83.71% 514.06%
31 Dec 2014 20,465,725,129,222 16,708,138,425,138 3,757,586,704,084 81.64% 444.65%
31 Dec 2015 29,831,584,489,092 22,142,745,777,902 7,688,838,711,191 74.23% 287.99%
Average 21,717,343,451,735 17,182,546,150,351 4,534,797,301,385 79.12% 378.90%
Source: Bulog (2011 - 2015)
Meanwhile, there are private companies—that might include small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs)—that are capable of importing rice, including the regular rice commonly consumed as 
staple food. In 2014, the government issued import permits to 13 private companies to import 
rice for industrial purposes (Agus, 2014; Handoyo and Santosa, 2014; Mohamad, 2014) and to 
40 private companies to import rice for special dietary needs (Herlinda, 2014; JituNews.com, 
2014; KabarBisnis.com, 2014). These circumstances indicate that there are private companies 
that have the capacity to import regular rice for the consumers, if only the government allows 
them to do so.
11 Bulog’s finance comprises assets, liabilities, and equity. Their assets include current assets (such as cash and cash equivalents, 
trade receivables, and stock inventories) and fixed assets (such as property and vehicles). Most of their liabilities (83.25%) are short-
term bank loans. Their equity includes government capital and the equity of its subsidiaries (Bulog, 2011 – 2015).
12 High debt to equity ratio (D/E ratio) indicates the company has been aggressive in financing its growth with debt (Investopedia, 
2016). Since Bulog’s business activities are strictly dictated by the government, the cost of debt potentially outweighs the returns, 
thus put the company under high risk.
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Recommendations
The price ceiling introduced by MOT 27/2017 has been unable to lower rice prices for consumers. 
Instead, Indonesian rice is nearly twice as expensive as Thai rice which the World Bank uses 
for international market references. Bulog is the only company authorized to import rice for 
ordinary consumption, in accordance with MOT 103/2015 article 9 (1.b), but its government-
directed purchases cause an unnecessary waste of public funds, since they have directed Bulog 
to buy when prices already increased. 
Three recommendations may improve the situation:
A. Remove MOT 27/2017 on ceiling price
The government should remove price ceiling on rice and instead use the international 
trade to lower consumer prices. The price ceiling has been ineffective as proven by the 
average market price of rice from September 2016 to May 2017 that reached IDR 10,646.56 
per kilogram or 12.07% more expensive than the price ceiling. In May 2017, rice price in 
Indonesia was around twice higher than the rice price in the international market. 
The price ceiling policy also places the onus for lowering rice prices on retailers, 
including the small-scale ones in the traditional markets. This is unfair as these retailers 
have much slimmer profit margins than other actors in the distribution chain, including 
the middlemen, the rice millers, and the wholesalers.
B. Remove MOT 103/2015 article 9 (1.b) and allow qualified private companies to 
import rice
The government should remove article 9 (1.b), which grants a monopoly on rice import to Bulog. 
The private sector should be allowed to import rice not only for industrial purposes and special 
dietary needs but also normal rice that is commonly consumed as staple food. The shorter 
distribution chain for imported rice would provide an alternative to the problematic distribution 
chains for domestic rice. More importantly, Indonesia would become more integrated into the 
international rice market with its lower prices, and poor people will be able to fulfil their need 
for rice more affordably.
Bulog is not positioned to be an efficient rice importer since it is subject to political considerations 
and bureaucratic procedures of the government. This state-owned enterprise spends more than it 
should on rice import, and its financial situation deteriorates. Maintaining Bulog as the sole importer 
risks further waste of public funds and might even lead to rice shortages if Bulog run out of financial 
means to procure the rice. 
Maintaining Bulog as the sole importer risks further waste of 
public funds and might even lead to rice shortages if Bulog run 
out of financial means to procure the rice. 
Price ceiling policy 
is unfair for the 
retailers as they 
have much slimmer 
profit margins than 
other actors in the 
distribution chain
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Therefore, rice importation must be opened as business opportunities for the qualified private 
companies. These companies must prove their capability in reading the rice market situation both 
in Indonesia and in the international market and then make their decision to import rice accordingly. 
As for the government, rather than trying to control imports directly, it should focus on its role as 
regulator by setting the criteria, verifying information provided by the private companies regarding 
their qualifications, and ensuring fairness and transparency in competition between those companies. 
C. Bulog should only participate in the rice distribution during emergency 
situations
Given their hampered ability to import rice efficiently, Bulog should shift all of its focus to disaster 
relief: preparing, managing, and distributing rice during emergency situations such as natural 
disasters. In 2015 the National Agency for Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana/BNPB) recorded 1,681 disasters that took 259 lives and displaced more than 1.2 million 
people (2015). During these emergencies, Bulog distributed only 37.08% (9,271 kilograms) of rice 
from their 25,000 kilograms of allocated stock to affected areas (Bulog, 2015).  
During the first half of 2017, there were 1,234 recorded disasters across the country, including 
floods, landslides, tornadoes, and earthquakes (BNPB, 2017). BNPB predicts that these disasters 
will frequently happen again in the future (Natalyn & Nadlir, 2017), and therefore, Bulog must 
improve its performance in alleviating their impact on the rice supply in affected regions. 
During the 1,681 emergency situations 
2015, Bulog only distributed 37.08% 
from their allocated rice stock to the 
affected areas 
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Annex
Analysis on rice prices in Indonesia and in the international market
A. Data Source and Data Period
We analyze the relationship between the logarithm (log) of domestic retail price (which is the 
same as the consumer price, PD) of the food items in Indonesia expressed in IDR/kilogram and 
the log world price for same food items (PW) expressed in USD/kilogram, while controlling 
for movements expressed in rupiah/dollar exchange rates (ER) also in logarithm form and all 
logarithms are natural. The average monthly data on retail prices (PD) were obtained from the 
(Statistics Indonesia, 2017) (BPS) for the period May 2009 until May 2017 (97 observations). 
World prices (PW) were obtained from the (World Bank, 2017) Database (The Pink Sheet) for the 
same period. The nominal rupiah/dollar exchange rates (ER) were obtained from (X-Rates, 2017) 
Converter Exchange Rates for same period.
This paper combines qualitative and quantitative methods. For the quantitative method, we used 
error correction models (ECM). An ECM is a dynamic model in which the movement of the variables 
in any periods is related to the previous period’s gap from long-run equilibrium (cointegrated). 
Furthermore, if the series is cointegrated, and the ECM validated, then it will encompass any 
other dynamic specification - such as the partial adjustment mechanism.
The first step entails estimating a long-run relationship between domestic prices (PD) and world 
prices (PW), while controlling for foreign exchange rates (ER) is to use two-step method of (Engle 
& Granger, 1987), called symmetric ECM test. According to this approach, if the variables are 
cointegrated of the same order, then for those variables integrated of order one (I(1)) with a 
cointegration relation of the form as in equation (1):
  (1)
would produce a stationary  term (error term/residuals) after estimating this equation with an 
OLS (ordinary least square) procedure, where α and β are estimated parameters. If the residuals 
of equation (1) are stationary, then an error correction mechanism exists.
Second, the ECM is specified by using lagged residuals from the co-integrating regression in 
equation (1) as error correction terms (ECT) and using ∆ as the difference indicator (differencing 
means subtracting  from ) as follows in equation (2):
 
 
 
 (2)
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B. Preliminary Findings
As shown in Figure 8, the domestic food price increased every month. The price of rice rose 98% 
from around Rp 6,641 per kilogram in May 2009 to more than Rp 13,125 per kilogram in May 
2017. The world food price increased slightly but was almost stable every month. The price of 
rice increased just about 1.12% from around Rp 5,547 per kilogram in May 2009 to Rp 5.609 per 
kilogram in May 2017. We found that at May 2017, domestic rice price was almost 2 times higher 
compared to world price.
Figure 8
The Trend of Rice Prices in Indonesia and in International Market
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2009M05, 5,546.77
2009M05, 6,641.00
2013M05, 5,300.37
2013M05, 10,646.00
2017M05, 5,609.28
2017M05, 13,125.00
Sources are collated from Statistics Indonesia (2009 - 2017), The World Bank (2009 - 2017), and X-rates.com (2017)
As shown in Equation 1 results below, in the long run, changes in world rice price do not affect 
the domestic rice price changes.
 
(***): denotes significance at 1% of confident level
And as shown in Equation 2 results below, in the short run a 10% increase in the world rice 
price over the previous period causes an instantaneous 1.09% increase in the domestic price 
current period, ceteris paribus and vice versa. 
(***): denotes significance at 1% of confident level
(**): denotes significance at 5% of confident level
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